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Abstract 
From  a  reactive,  antagonistic  stance  towards  environmental  regulations, 
many  firms have evolved to act in a  pro-active  fashion  to  integrate 
environmental issues into their core strategies. Driving force behind this 
development is a growing insight that environmental efforts can potentially 
be a source of val ue. Yet, while shareholders appear to be laggards with
respect  to r ecognizing  this pote ntial,  managers  appear  to ha ve  a  more
accurate  and  acute perception of these possibilities of environmental
strategies. Using measures of different corporate governance instruments 
that proxy for the ability of managers or shareholders to implement their
strategic  preferences we dem onstrate  empirically  that  shareholders  are
indeed laggards because they lower firm environmental performance while
the  latter  actually  has  positive  effects  on f irm  financial  performance.
Managers,  however,  push  for  better environmental and hence financial
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While empirical evidence is mounting that firm environmental performance has a (mostly 
positive) impact on firm performance (e.g., Russo & Fouts, 1997; U.S. EPA, 2000; Hart & Ahuja, 
1996; Christmann, 2000; Dowell, Hart & Yeung, 2000; Delmas, 2001; Melnyk, Sroufe & 
Calantone, 2003), several studies also suggest that equity investors are either on the sidelines or 
outright negatively disposed when it comes to firm strategies dealing with environmental issues 
(UNEP, 2004; U.S. EPA, 2000; Molloy, Erekson & Gorman, 2002). Yet, we do observe many 
firms that, through their managers, go ￿beyond compliance￿ and engage in pro-active strategies 
to reduce pollution levels (e.g. Melnyk at al., 2003) or to even benefit from developing unique 
capabilities related to their environmental efforts (e.g. Russo & Fouts, 1997; Delmas, 2001). 
The question raised by these observations, and the central focus of this paper, is whether 
shareholders are ￿laggards￿ in the sense that they resist a development that has potentially 
positive implications for themselves and that their agents already engage in. In fact, it appears as 
though equity investors consider environmental issues still primarily as a potential drag on 
profits, as related expenses will ultimately come out of their residual claims to the firm and are 
thus something to be avoided, if possible. Yet, managers appear to have a different, more pro-
environmental perspective. We suggest that several reasons may account for such a difference of 
opinion. First, managers, being more involved in day to day operations, may be able to judge 
better than shareholders whether recent ideas suggesting that environmental performance may 
add rather than destroy value are indeed applicable to their firms. From this perspective, 
managers would simply use such better information to work in the interest of ￿laggard￿ 
shareholders. A second possibility is that managers may heed calls and pressure for better 
environmental performance by governments, organizations like Greenpeace, employees or other 
groups, in order to appease such external stakeholders. This may allow managers to satisfy their 
own consciousness or keep these groups from interfering with firm strategies or inflicting 
economic or legal harm on the firm or its executives. To the extent that managers indeed ￿buy￿ 
more strategic freedom with pro-environmental strategies, they again act in the interest of 
shareholders. However, if managers￿ primary concern lies in satisfying other stakeholders￿ 
demands for the purpose of enhancing their own reputation, avoiding personal retributions, or 
satisfying their own consciousness, the issue is not primarily one of ￿laggard￿ shareholders, but 
that of a moral hazard agency problem ￿ at least from the perspective of shareholders. 
This study aims to assess to what extent investors are indeed laggards in their stance 
towards environmental management by focusing on the relationship between different corporate 
governance structures (particularly monitoring versus incentives) that may provide more or less 
leverage for shareholders, respectively managers, to implement their ideas, and a firm￿s observed 
environmental performance levels. We further examine whether the interpretation of laggard or 
agency problem is more appropriate by analyzing whether, if higher environmental performance 
is driven by managerial actions, such performance also positively affects the bottom line ￿ 
indicating support for the laggard theory ￿ or not ￿ suggesting a potential agency issue. 
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Our contributions are thus, on one hand, to addresses the crucial policy question of the 
extent to which shareholders or managers work for or against achieving high levels of 
environmental performance, which also adds to existing work on the motivations for firms to 
engage in environmental activities (e.g. Bansal & Roth, 2000) and the role of managerial 
discretion in this context (e.g. Arrag￿n-Correa, Mat￿as-Reche & Senise-Barrio, 2004; Sharma, 
2000). On the other hand, we deliver new evidence on the link between environmental and firm 
performance and identify the moderating role of governance structure for this relationship. This 
contributes to the corporate governance literature, as well as to the emerging strategic literature 
on pro-environmental management, which has so far concentrated on analyzing the resource-
based underpinnings of the link between environmental and financial performance as well as 
identifiying internal and external moderators such as industry growth, uncertainty, complexity, or 
complementary assets (e.g. Russo & Fouts, 1997; Arag￿n-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Christmann, 
2000). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the U.S. environmental protection agency (U.S. EPA, 2000), responses of 
firms to environmental issues fall into three, roughly historically successive phases. In the first 
phase, firms accustomed to treat the environment as a free source of inputs and equally free 
deposit for waste materials, took a strongly negative view of emerging environmental legislation. 
Accordingly, the focus, shared by managers and owners, was that of minimizing or avoiding the 
costs associated with compliance, which usually took the form of ￿end-of-pipe￿ solutions like 
adding filters. These rather reactive solutions created little or no value added, leading to a de 
facto negative correlation between environmental investments and financial performance (e.g., 
Jaggi & Freedman, 1992, for evidence on the late 1970s). 
In a second phase, firms, searching for less costly ways to comply, turned to a more pro-
active approach that included conducting internal audits and implementing environmental 
management systems (EMS) that, by redesigning entire productive processes, were intended to 
ensure regulatory compliance while at the same time improving operating margins by reducing 
required inputs and productively using by-products that were formerly wasted. Along the same 
line fall attempts to implement concepts of eco-efficiency (DeSimone & Popoff, 1997), which 
prescribe ways to achieve a sustainable development by, for instance, reducing the material or 
energy intensity or enhancing the durability and recyclability of products. Multiple studies 
provide evidence that the introduction of an EMS indeed results in significant benefits for firms 
by finding, for example, increases in self-reported levels of competitive advantage (Delmas, 
2001), or increases in various measures of corporate performance (Melnyk et al., 2003). 
However, these authors caution that positive effects only accrue, or are much stronger, if 
firms do not simply pay lip service to implementing an EMS or focus on simple environmental 
compliance, but use the process of implementation to form strong relationships with internal and 
external stakeholders (Delmas, 2001), or maximize organizational involvement by actually 
certifying their EMS within the ISO 14000 family of standards (Melnyk et al., 2003). IE Working Paper                                        DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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Conceptually, these views on the value of EMSs lead over to a third phase, which is characterized 
by firms going beyond compliance and focusing on value creation through environmental 
strategies that include creating environmentally friendly products for increasingly environment-
conscious customers, and the creation of unique organizational capabilities. The latter issue 
includes, for instance, combining off-the shelve hardware with firm specific organizational 
routines in the environmentally oriented redesign of whole firms, which can lead to uniquely 
efficient capabilities that are difficult to match by less environmentally pro-active competitors 
(Russo & Fouts, 1997). Supporting this theory, Russo and Fouts (1997) indeed find higher 
environmental performance linked to higher financial performances (return on assets). Other 
authors have further theoretically and empirically supported this link and identified important 
moderators such as external contingencies or pre-existing complementary capabilities (Aragon-
Correa & Sharma, 2003; Christmann, 2000). 
 Accompanying these three phases, we also observe an increase in the level and severity 
of environmental legislation ranging from new regulations on environmental disclosure by the 
U.S. EPA to the Kyoto protocol. Epstein (1996), for instance, describes a significant change in 
the criminal enforcement of environmental laws that includes going directly after corporate 
officers (with potential prison fines) in an attempt to enforce greater adherence to the laws, and 
reports that manager￿s concern for environmental liability is rising strongly. Simultaneously, we 
can observe increasing environmental activism by groups such as Greenpeace, which may 
include boycotts or public relations campaigns that have the potential to seriously hurt the target 
firms￿ financial performance (see greenpeace.org).  
Altogether, there has been a development from a purely antagonistic relationship between 
firms and environmental topics towards a rather pro-active embrace of these issues driven by 
increasing social pressures on one hand, and by a consideration of the potential of value creation 
on the other. Particularly the latter point is supported by a growing empirical literature 
confirming that environmental performance indeed appears to be positively linked to firm 
financial performance and other measures of competitive advantage. 
Shareholders 
We suggested above that equity investors demonstrate a lack of interest in environmental 
topics. In fact, a recent United Nations￿ study (UNEP, 2004), while finding that environmental, 
among other social factors, do affect long term shareholder value, complained about the general 
lack of interest in these topics among brokerage house analysts. Likewise, the U.S. EPA report 
(2000:5) on the relationship between environmental and financial performance, suggests that 
while equity investors care about environmental issues in traditionally sensitive areas like mining, 
they do not generally understand how environmental decisions affect a firm￿s future and ￿remain 
sceptical about the value of understanding corporate environmental performance.￿ Moreover, 
while showing overall little active involvement in environmental issues, ￿equity investor tend to 
think that environmental protection has potentially negative consequences for firms￿ (U.S. EPA, IE Working Paper                                         DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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2000:5). Molloy et al.￿s (2002) empirical findings further ￿suggest that if investors consider 
environmental performance at all, they perceive environmental improvements and management 
as costly, unless made to avoid non-compliance penalties.￿ 
These accounts indicate that shareholders are mainly concerned with the potential 
downsides of environmental issues ￿ the costs involved in compliance with environmental 
regulations, and the risks of non-compliance. Potentially positive effects on firm capabilities, as 
suggested above, seem to play a minor, if any, role in shareholders concerns, which suggests that 
they are indeed ￿laggards￿, at least in the sense of maintaining a ￿phase 1￿ type perception of 
environmental issues. In fact, Molloy et al. (2002) find a negative relation between low emissions 
and stock returns within industries, implying that shareholders still consider environmental 
performance as something rather to be avoided. 
Several studies focusing on the impact of measures expressing potentially negative 
implications for firms (e.g. fines, lawsuits, negative reports) and market based measures of return 
further support the suggestion that shareholders￿ primary concern is with the cost involved in 
environmental activities and particularly risks created by environmental legislation. Muoghalu, 
Robinson, and Glascock (1990), for example, find a strong negative reaction to lawsuits filed 
against polluters. Hamilton (1995) finds negative market returns for firms included in the first 
release of the toxic release inventory (TRI ￿ see below) data in June, 1989. These effects were 
stronger, the more exposure (different types of controlled chemicals) a firm had. In a similar 
study, Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy (1998) find negative market reactions to firms that were named 
repeatedly on a Canadian government listing of polluters. In fact, stock market reactions are 
usually much larger than the expected fines or immediate costs would warrant, suggesting that 
such negative news may be taken by investors as general indications of lacking management 
quality, since, for instance, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest that pollution efficiency is 
often associated with overall productive efficiency. 
Overall, these results are consonant with the view that mainstream investors focus on the 
downside risk. While another group of ￿ethical investors￿ exists, who only invest in firms with 
good environmental performance, regardless of financial implications (i.e. these investors are 
willing to ￿pay to be green￿), this group does not appear to be very strong. In fact while the 
percentage of U.S. financial assets under management that is invested in socially responsible 
investments has recently risen to as much as 11% (Social Investment Forum, 2003), investment 
funds that exclusively focus on environmental issues have all but disappeared due to the greater 
importance currently associated with broader social issues (interviews with SRI fund managers). 
Consequently, the prevailing reaction of shareholders with respect to environmental issues 
will be one of trying to merely comply with or avoid environmental regulations that may apply to 
firms they are invested in, reflecting a general mindset that sees environmental efforts as a drain 
on firm performance and thus as a pure cost to the equity owner. This stance is quite consonant 
with the way investors and managers viewed the initial introduction of environmental legislation 
in the first phase described above (U.S. EPA, 2000). Hence, we expect that shareholders, to the IE Working Paper                                         DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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extent that they care at all, will prefer firms to hold back on investments into improving firm 
environmental performance. 
Proposition 1: Shareholders prefer to limit investments into firm environmental 
performance. 
Executives 
It is a reasonable assumption, and in fact a basic tenet of agency theory (e.g. Zajac, 1990), 
that managers have a greater depth of information on the specific operating conditions within a 
firm than shareholders. Executives are therefore more likely to recognize whether environmental 
strategies like implementing an EMS, subscribing to eco-efficiency standards, or building unique 
environmental capabilities, may indeed generate value for their firm and shareholders. Melnyk et 
al. (2003), for instance, report that managers indeed perceive of benefits well beyond pollution 
control when implementing a formal EMS. Thus, managers will have a more accurate 
understanding than shareholders of how environmental technologies have progressed through the 
three stages described above from being a pure cost to a potential source of value. 
Yet, executives may also have a more acute awareness of environmental issues than 
shareholders given their exposure as the representatives of their firms to the demands of external 
and internal stakeholders for good environmental citizenship. Employees may prefer to work for 
￿green￿ firms, Greenpeace (see greenpeace.org) and other non-governmental organizations 
threaten polluting firms with potentially damaging public relations campaigns, and government 
regulators increasingly tighten the noose around the executives￿ neck by assigning personal 
liability for environmental violations (e.g. Epstein, 1996). Hence, executives will feel more 
immediately challenged and more personally threatened than shareholders by reactions to 
negative environmental performance records or environmental accidents like the Bhopal disaster 
or the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and thus make ￿greener management de rigueur in corporate board 
rooms￿ (Gabel and Sinclair-DesagnØ, 1993: 231). A pro-active environmental management 
stance by executives can then be useful in maintaining or building firm value by preventing 
damaging reactions from such stakeholders. Yet, since environmental performance require 
significant investments, there may also be a limit to the value creating environmental investments 
a firm should undertake in balancing environmental and financial aspects of performance. 
Managers with an acute sense of the social desirability of a high environmental performance may 
overstep this boundary in an attempt to appease external stakeholders, which could earn the 
manager added strategic freedom (no interference from stakeholders) or personal satisfaction 
(high social esteem, or satisfy own desire to be ￿green￿). Another reason for overstepping the 
limit may lie in the fact that executives bear disproportional more risk than shareholders due to 
their personal, criminal liability. However, Campbell, Sefcik and Soderstrom (2004) find that 
executives in many firms are explicitly compensated for these risks, which should mitigate this 
tendency. Altogether, executives￿ more accurate and acute perception of environmental issues 
suggests that executives will be predisposed to increase environmental performance for reasons 
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identified by Bansal and Roth (2000) as major drivers for firms in general to engage in corporate 
ecological responsiveness. This leads to our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: Managers will invest into improving firm environmental performance. 
Although focusing on different issues, some prior research supports this proposition by 
showing that managers, under certain conditions, are protagonists of pro-environmental 
management. Arag￿n-Correa, et al. (2004), for example, find that organizations in which specific 
individuals assume responsibilities (and have discretion) for environmental management achieve 
a higher environmental commitment than others. Similarly, Sharma (2000) reports that firms are 
more likely to engage in voluntary environmental strategies when managers, because of a pro-
environmental firm orientation or available slack, interpret environmental issues as opportunities.   
Corporate Governance Structure as Moderator 
It is a reasonable conjecture that the ability of shareholders to enforce their preferences 
will depend on the particular corporate governance choices made in each firm. Specifically, the 
structure of a firm￿s corporate governance mechanism will matter to the extent that managers (as 
agents of shareholders) obtain more or less ability to influence firm strategies. Generally, if 
principals could costlessly monitor the actions of managers, they would do so, but as the cost of 
directly assessing managers￿ actions increases, a different governance mechanism is needed (e.g. 
Zajac & Westphal, 1994). In recent years, the provisioning of incentives via equity-based 
compensation has therefore been used in many firms to supplement the monitoring task by 
assuring that managers￿ incentives are aligned with those of stockholders (e.g. Hall & Liebman, 
1998; Yermack, 1995). At the same time, however, top executives have gained more discretion in 
their strategic choices as they are relatively less tightly monitored. Given this situation, firms in 
which monitoring is relatively prevalent should afford shareholders with a greater opportunity to 
implement their views in actual strategies. Coupled with proposition 1 from the preceding 
discussion, this suggests: 
Hypothesis, 1:  By allowing shareholders to implement their preferences, high levels 
of monitoring will lead to lower corporate environmental performance.  
Further, if shareholders are indeed laggards in the sense that they reject pro-active 
environmental strategies although such efforts may be positive for them, the following hypothesis 
should hold: 
Hypothesis 2a: Although high levels of monitoring lead to negative effects on 
environmental performance, the latter has a positive effect on financial firm 
performance (laggard theory). 
If, on the other hand, environmental issues are indeed just a cost for firms, then 
shareholders, if they indeed hold back on environmental efforts, are simply protecting their own 
interests as suggested in the next hypothesis. IE Working Paper                                          DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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Hypothesis 2b: While high levels of monitoring lead to negative effects on 
environmental performance, the latter also has a negative effect on financial firm 
performance (protector theory). 
Yet, as suggested before, increasing organizational complexity that places a greater 
demand on managerial involvement can lead to situations where monitoring becomes 
exceedingly difficult and hence costly. Under such circumstances, alternative governance 
mechanisms that attempt to align managerial and shareholder incentives are likely to be used. 
Zajac and Westphal (1994), for instance, find that diversification increases the use of equity-
based managerial incentives to the extent that such diversification boosts the complexity of the 
managerial task. Accordingly, they found monitoring to be most prevalent for simple firms and 
those following a very diversified conglomerate strategy, which commonly uses relatively easy to 
monitor financial oversight mechanisms. Monitoring was less, and incentives more prevalent in 
firms with intermediate degrees of diversification, reflecting the need for managers to have 
enough discretion to create complex interrelationships between related business units. Similarly, 
technology intensive businesses or internationalisation create complex and management intensive 
growth options that appear to also increase management complexity and lead to more incentive 
pay (e.g., Henderson & Frederickson, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Altogether, there is 
considerable support for Zajac and Westphal￿s (1994) suggestion that ￿￿some corporate 
strategies are generally more complex than others, and ￿ complex corporate strategies are 
costlier for boards of directors to monitor.￿ This evidence shows that as information-asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers grows, monitoring becomes increasingly difficult and costly 
and will be replaced by incentive based measures. The latter, especially when based on equity-
instruments, are provided to align managers￿ incentives with the equity-owner goal of share price 
maximization (e.g. Jensen & Murphy, 1990), and thus to assure that managers use their strategic 
discretion in solving these information-intensive issues in the best interest of the shareholders. 
Yet, this also suggests that firms with an existing high level of incentive pay do grant their 
executives a high degree of freedom to implement what the managers￿ believe to be best for the 
firm and its shareholders. Hence, following the argument above, reflected in proposition 2, the 
presence of incentive based compensation programs should positively affect managers￿ ability to 
carry out strategies to improve a firm￿s environmental performance. 
Hypothesis 3: By giving managers more discretion, high levels of (equity-based) 
incentive pay will lead to positive effects on environmental firm performance. 
As discussed above, while perhaps not complying with an expressed or implicit 
shareholder preference of shying away from environmental performance enhancing activities, 
such an action may still be in the shareholders￿ best interest if managers are convinced that 
environmental performance will indeed be positively linked to financial performance. The 
empirical findings that incentive pay will be high in more complex firms lend further support to 
the suggestion that managers (in cases of high incentives) have more in-depth firm knowledge 
that allows them to more accurately judge ￿ as compared to shareholders ￿ whether IE Working Paper                                       DE8-114-I                                  19 - 01 - 2005 
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environmental activities can indeed yield additional value in their respective firms because of 
positive performance effects or because of creating strategic insulations from stakeholder claims. 
In this case, undertaking environmentally positive actions is entirely in line with the managers￿ 
incentive structure, as such actions are believed to strengthen financial performance and 
subsequently equity values, which in turn benefits managers via their incentive compensation 
schemes. Specifically, whether or not equity-investors have an ex-ante negative expectation of 
the financial value of environmental activities (which are difficult to observe), managers would 
expect positive investor reactions to observable increases in the firms￿ actual financial 
performance. In this manner, managers may act against shareholder preferences, but in the 
latter￿s interests because shareholders, in this situation, are laggards. In fact, here, managers 
simply perform in a way that is expected of them, as they receive equity-based incentives and 
related discretion precisely in order to manage tasks for which shareholders have insufficient 
information. In this case, the following hypothesis should hold: 
Hypothesis 4a: High levels of incentives lead to positive effects on environmental 
performance, which in turn has a positive effect on financial firm performance 
(laggard theory). 
Yet, the added freedom managers enjoy in firms with high incentive-based pay, may also 
allow executives to not only act against shareholder preferences but also against shareholder 
interests. Particularly, if managers pursue environmental strategies not because of a belief in their 
added value but because of a quest of sources of private value, a moral hazard problem occurs.  
Theoretically, incentives are designed to balance out executives￿ desire to gain private 
benefits from the firm. However, as discussed before, shareholders, if they are indeed laggards, 
may not be aware of or interested in environmental affairs and thus may not have thought of 
incorporating provisions to counter potential private incentives for executives arising from this 
side. Another reasonable assumption is that, if shareholders are laggards and still hang on to an 
early view that environmental performance is bad for business, they may expect to share this 
view with executives. Hence they would not include any specific governance provisions to align 
managerial with shareholder interests concerning environmental strategies. Coupled with the 
historical progression of executives views on this matter (increasingly pro-active behaviors due to 
either beliefs in value-added properties or awareness of increasingly severe personal liabilities of 
environmental issues), a reasonable assumption is therefore that the pressures (and personal 
incentives) that have build over the last two to three decades on executives have not been (fully) 
integrated in incentive pay schemes. Thus, managers may derive private benefits (reputation with 
outside stakeholders, acting according to their own consciousness) that may outweigh a possible 
negative impact on their equity based compensation and thus cause managers to act against 
shareholder interests in this case. The critical issue, therefore, is that the same corporate 
governance instrument ￿ high incentive-based compensation ￿ that is traditionally used to align 
managerial incentives with those of shareholders also allows for a certain level of strategic 
discretion that can enable managers to pursue such strategies. This leads to our final hypothesis: IE Working Paper                                       DE8-114-I                                  19 - 01 - 2005 
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Hypothesis 4b: High levels of incentives lead to positive effects on environmental 
performance, which in turn has a negative effect on financial firm performance 
(agency theory). 
METHODS 
We have assembled a database on U.S. firms from several sources to perform two types of 
analyses in order to test our hypotheses. First, we relate measures of environmental performance 
to measures of corporate governance indicating high degrees of monitoring or incentive 
compensation to assess the role played by shareholders or managers in pushing for more or less 
environmental firm performance. Second, we analyze whether these measures of environmental 
performance affect firm financial performance in order to shed light on the type of motivation 
driving shareholders or managers in their attitude towards environmental performance. 
Dependent Variables 
Environmental Measures. To create measures of environmental performance we rely on 
data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which has been used in prior 
studies on environmental issues (e.g. Molloy, Erekson & Gorman, 2002; Hart and Ahuja, 1996). 
IRRC aggregates plant level filings on type and amount of waste production and treatment to the 
U.S. environmental protection agency (the ￿toxic release inventory￿), and also provides 
information on fines and penalties for environmental violations. Since IRRC data is mostly 
reported on a mandatory basis (firm pollution data), or reflects factual outcomes (penalty data), 
this data provides a reasonably objective measure of firm environmental performance. We use 
this data to generate three different measures that reflect whether or not a firm follows a pro-
active approach towards environmental issues. 
The first measure of environmental performance is based on the total amount of toxic 
chemical waste produced by a firm in a given year. Firms in SIC codes 2000 to 3999 (entire 
manufacturing sector) are required to report emissions for a considerable number of toxic 
chemicals once they exceed certain minimum thresholds of emissions. To construct a variable 
indicating pro-active environmental management (￿relative waste production￿ or REL_WASTE), 
we identified in each 2-digit industry the firm with the highest value of total waste and then 
subtracted from this worst polluter￿s amount of total waste (as natural log) the waste amounts of 
each firm in the industry (also in logs). Given this specification, increasing values of this proxy 
indicate a greater distance to the worst polluting firm and thus a better environmental 
performance. Although several firms in other SIC code industries also report values for chemical 
wastes (e.g. if they have minor operations in manufacturing industries and therefore have to 
report as well), we chose to limit the data to the manufacturing sector to ensure that the distance 
between worst polluting and focal firm is indeed a meaningful measure. Including other 
industries may impair our ability to compare levels of waste if reported waste applies to only a 
fraction of a firm￿s operations, or if few firms report levels (for involvement in potentially 
different other industries - although results for models including all observations yield essentially IE Working Paper                                        DE8-114-I                                 19 - 01 - 2005 
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the same results as those reported here). With respect to our hypotheses, following a pro-active 
approach with regard to the environment is likely to result in firm practices that lead to a lower 
value of waste generation, particularly as compared to firms in the same industry with a less pro-
active stance. Hence, given our hypotheses 1 and 3, we expect that ￿incentives￿ will be positively 
related to this measure by giving managers discretion to act indeed pro-actively, while 
￿monitoring￿ should be negatively related, as shareholders may be afraid of the costs involved 
and thus attempt to hold the firm back from making related investments. 
For a second variable, we exploit the fact that the IRRC has recently begun to break up 
the reporting of waste production into three (additive) elements ￿ ￿toxic chemicals transfers and 
releases,￿ which represent the fraction of waste that is directly emitted into air or water, or 
deposited ￿ untreated ￿ in off-site locations (often private hazardous waste disposal facilities), as 
well as ￿energy recovery and recycling￿ and ￿treatment,￿ which denote the fraction of total waste 
that is treated by the firm, or recycled or burned for energy recovery. Given a total level of waste, 
the last two elements actually denote positive aspects of firm environmental performance. In fact, 
recovery, recycling and treatment are part of what an environmental management system 
prescribes for the waste still produced even in environmentally pro-active firms. Thus, we expect 
that the fraction of total waste that is recovered, recycled and treated (RECOVERY), increases 
with pro-active management practices, and hence be positively related to incentives and negative 
to monitoring. For this measure, we utilize all available data (i.e. on manufacturing and other 
industries), as the concern regarding industry membership discussed above does not apply. What 
is of importance for the RECOVERY measure is whether, given a total amount of waste already 
reported, efforts were made to recycle, treat or recover. 
For the final environmental performance measure, we use the reported number of 
environmental penalties in a given year. However, this count variable is somewhat difficult to 
interpret ￿ specifically, with respect to our theory, there may be a large difference between 
having no penalties and having one, but, given that the firm is already part of the ￿violators￿, a 
value greater than one may be less informative. In keeping with our goal to create variables that 
measure whether firms are run based on integrating pro-active management practices, we have 
therefore created a dummy variable (VIOLATOR) that takes on the value of one if firms are 
fined, and zero otherwise. Having a value of one is thus equal to belonging to the ￿violator￿ set of 
firms, which is the case for about 20% of firms in a given year. We expect incentives to be 
negatively related to this measure (if managers are pro-active and thus prevent firms from 
incurring fines), and monitoring positive (i.e. shareholders, by trying to hold back environmental 
investments make it more likely that firms become a violator). Like RECOVERY, we use all 
available observations, since IRRC collects information on all environmentally related fines and 
convictions across all industries, and there are occurrences in a wide array of SIC codes. 
In general, pro-active approaches to environmental performance, even the capability 
generating effects described by Russo & Fouts (1997), are based to a large extent in changing 
processes that have as a common effect the (potentially beyond compliance) reduction of 
environmental wastes (and thus also the avoidance of fines). Hence, these three measures, while IE Working Paper                                        DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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not being able to directly assess the actual extent to which a firm has become pro-active and 
involved in environmental capability creation, should deliver a good first approximation of the 
strategy a firm is taking. 
For the variables REL_WASTE and RECOVERY, we use data on the last available year 
(2001) and the two preceding years, while VIOLATOR is collected for 2000 to 2002 (last 
available year). In each case, availability of these environmental variables (together with the 
availability of data on monitoring ￿ see below) determines the final sample size, which consists 
of 187 unique firms for REL_WASTE, 269 for RECOVERY and 487 for VIOLATOR. 
Financial Measures. To test the hypotheses postulating a link between environmental and 
financial performance, we use a simple accounting measure of performance. Our hypotheses call 
for assessing whether good environmental performance is positively associated with financial 
performance and potential value increases for shareholders. Since one of our hypotheses 
conceptualises a lack of interest or a negative pre-disposition of shareholders in environmental 
issues, it must be expected that such a bias could influence any direct relationship between high 
environmental performance and stock market measures of value. Therefore, we are focusing on 
ROA as a measure of firm performance (e.g. as used by Russo & Fouts, 1997). Increases in this 
measure indicate a positive direct effect on firm financial performance effect, which can then 
form the basis for stock market valuations. 
Independent Variables 
Main independent variables. To measure the degree of incentives given, we focus on the 
compensation of the CEO as the top decision maker in firms and use data from Execucomp to 
calculate two alternative variables that express the degree of incentive compensation and allow us 
to analyze the potentially varying effects of different elements of CEO pay structure. Specifically, 
for ￿EQUITY-INC￿ we calculate the fraction of stock options and restricted stock grants received 
in a given year over the total annual compensation received to assess the impact of the fraction of 
equity-based compensation. Since our hypotheses were formed with the discretionary effects of 
primarily equity-based compensation in mind we focus in our analysis on this measure. However, 
in order to gauge the effects of different types of incentive compensation we form a second ratio, 
￿NON-EQUITY-INC,￿ with annual bonus and long-term incentive pay in the numerator. These 
are common approaches to assess pay structure (e.g. Zajac & Westphal, 1994) and suitable to 
analyze the impact of different levels of incentive pay on the dependent variable. Further, data 
from the Execucomp database is frequently used in corporate governance work (e.g. Carpenter & 
Sanders, 2002; Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999). 
To assess the degree of monitoring, we use information from the compensation 
consultancy firm Spencer & Stuart to calculate the ratio of outsiders to total members of the 
board of directors (OUTSIDER). This measure has been used in several previous studies (e.g. 
Zajac & Westphal, 1994; Lambert, Larcker & Weigelt, 1993) as a proxy for the independence of 
the board and thus for the potential strength of monitoring in a firm. Furthermore, Fields and IE Working Paper                                           DE8-114-I                                 19 - 01 - 2005 
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Keys (2003) recently summarized the evidence suggesting that outside directors indeed perform 
important monitoring functions for shareholders. 
Controls. First, a frequently mentioned problem in assessing the relationship between 
environmental actions and firm performance is that it is unclear whether good environmental 
performance causes good financial performance, or whether firms with good financials can 
simply afford to be green (e.g. U.S. EPA, 2000). We therefore control for prior firm performance 
in assessing the unique contribution of governance structure on environmental performance in the 
first type of models we estimate by including return on assets (ROA) as a control. 
Further, we include a number of variables that control for other effects on performance 
that are frequently considered in the literature (see Capon, Farley & Hoenig, 1990). In selecting 
these controls for firm and industry characteristics, we also follow closely Russo & Fouts￿ (1997) 
study relating environmental and financial performance. In particular, as indicators of firm 
characteristics, we include measures of firm growth rate, size and capital intensity. To address the 
characteristics of the industry, we further include a measure of industry concentration, as well as 
two dummy variables indicating whether firms operate in the 25% highest or lowest polluting 
industries (for the REL_WASTE variable, these dummies are re-calculated exclusively for the 
manufacturing sector). Finally, since we are pooling data for 3 years, we include year dummies to 
control for the fixed effects of particular events in a given year. 
Utilizing Compustat data, we operationalized these controls as follows. The variable 
GROWTH is calculated as the annual increase in firm sales as a percentage term. SIZE is defined 
as the log of firm sales, and capital intensity (CAPITAL_INT) as the ratio of assets to sales. For 
the industry concentration rate (IND_CONC) we calculated the four firm concentration ratio for 
each four digit industry based on Compustat data. These controls are included in all models. 
Model 
Our basic model links the three environmental performance variables to the 
contemporaneous variables expressing incentives (the CEO pay structure) and monitoring, as 
well as a number of controls. Due to the fact that incentives and particularly monitoring are not 
expected to vary much over time, the use of a fixed effects model has been ruled out. Instead, the 
observations for each firm are pooled and dummies to control for high and low polluting 
industries as well as year are included. 
Env.Perf.t = α + βa Incentivet + βb Monitoringt + βc CONTROLt + PERIOD + ε    (1) 
We use simple OLS regression for most models except for those with VIOLATOR as 
dependent variable. Since the latter is a binary variable, we use a logistic regression procedure for 
these models. 
The second type of models, linking environmental to financial performance has a similar IE Working Paper                                               DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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structure in terms of relating ROA to the same set of governance and control variables (minus 
ROA) as (1), plus including a measure of environmental performance as independent variable. 
All variables are lagged by one period relative to ROA in order to be able to assess causality. 
ROA t+1 = α + βa Env.Perf.t + βb Incentivet + βc Monitoringt + βd CONTROLt + PERIOD + ε    (2) 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 displays some simple statistics and correlations for our dataset. While we did not 
find any excessively large correlations, several significant relationships that pre-sage the results 
of our more detailed analyses are worth noting. First, firm success, as measured in terms of ROA, 
is apparently positively related to our first two environmental variables, but shows a negative 
association with equity-incentives and monitoring. Further, we observe an intuitively plausible 
relationship among two of our environmental variables ￿ a greater distance from the worst 
polluter in an industry (REL_WASTE) decreases the risk of becoming a VIOLATOR. Finally, 
we find a significant positive relationship between all environmental variables and incentives, 
and a negative one with monitoring at least for two of these variables (as noted above, 
VIOLATOR is a variable of bad environmental performance, thus, negative correlations indicate 
a positive effect of another variable on good environmental performance).   
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
It therefore does not surprise very much that the results of the first set of regressions 
(models 1-6 in table 2) strongly support our hypotheses 1 and 3 ￿ for all three measures of 
environmental performance, we find a significantly positive relationship between incentives and 
higher environmental performance (please note that the negative coefficient in model 6 indicates 
that incentives decrease the probability of being a violator). Simultaneously, we find that the ratio 
of outsiders on the board ￿ our measure of monitoring ￿ is negatively related to good 
environmental performance at least for the VIOLATOR variable (model 6 ￿ where the highly 
significant positive parameter estimate indicates that monitoring strongly increases the 
probability of becoming a violator) and for the relative waste measure (model 2). In each case, 
the introduction of the incentive and monitoring variables significantly enhances the model (R-
square and chi-square tests, respectively). Thus, we indeed find that managers and shareholders 
appear to follow different strategies with respect to firm environmental policies. While managers 
utilize their strategic discretion to enhance a firm￿s environmental profile, shareholders seem to 
work against that goal. These effects are also of economic significance, as a one standard 
deviation increase in incentive pay (which would increase the fraction of equity-based pay over 
total pay by 28.2 percentage points) decreases the likelihood of becoming a violator by 1.6 
percentage points (or by about 17%, evaluated at the means of all variables), while increasing the IE Working Paper                                                DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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percentage of treated waste by 6.5 percentage points, and increasing the distance-measure relative 
to the worst polluting firms in terms of total waste by .40 (the mean of the distance measure is 
3.20, the worst polluting firm is at zero). Similarly, for a one standard deviation increase in 
monitoring (increasing the fraction of outside directors by 11.4 percentage points), we would 
expect the likelihood of becoming a violator to increase by 4 percentage points (or by 42%) and 
the distance-measure to the worst polluter to shrink by .24. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Yet, the question remains whether shareholders are indeed laggards in terms of hesitating 
to subscribe to a more developed notion of environmental management and to accept the 
possibility that environmental investments could indeed generate rather than destroy value. If 
environmental efforts are indeed bad for business, then shareholders simply protect their 
investments (although this may be negative for other stakeholders including society at large). For 
managers, we have the similar question whether their pushing for higher environmental 
performance is motivated by an information advantage over shareholders, in terms of having 
simply more accurate insights into the production process and the value generation potential of 
environmental strategies, or whether they pursue more personal goals such as appeasing external 
stakeholders to relieve pressures and potential liabilities from their own shoulders. 
The second set of models (7-18) in table 3 provides some answers to these questions 
(which are captured in hypotheses 2a&b, and 4a&b). Specifically, for all three environmental 
variables we find a consistently positive relationship between good environmental performance 
and financial (accounting) performance (please note again that negative parameter estimates for 
VIOLATOR indicate a positive effect on firm performance of not incurring fines). As before, 
introducing the environmental variables significantly enhances each model (albeit only 
marginally for RECOVERY). 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
These results lend support to hypotheses 2a and 4a, postulating the ￿laggard￿ theory, and 
reject the alternative hypotheses 2b and 4b. In other words, after finding that managers use their 
discretion to enhance environmental performance, and shareholders to do the opposite, we have 
also established a positive link between these measures of environmental and a widely accepted 
measure of firm financial performance. This suggests that shareholders are indeed laggards, and 
that managers seem to act (primarily) based on an information advantage, and thus fully in line 
with the interests, if not the preferences, of their shareholders. On the other hand, the results are IE Working Paper                                               DE8-114-I                                 19 - 01 - 2005 
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clearly not consistent with either an agency view (i.e. managers push for more environmental 
performance, but against the interests of shareholders) or the idea that shareholders are simply 
protecting their interests. 
Utilizing the method of path analysis (Duncan 1975), we can also compute the magnitude 
of the indirect effects that incentives or monitoring, via the environmental variables, have on firm 
performance. Using the results from the first set of regression as the direct effect of incentive or 
monitoring on each environmental variable, we can compute the indirect effect by multiplying 
these values with the parameters we obtain for the environmental variables￿ effects on ROA in 
the second set of regressions, where we specified full models including the direct effects of 
incentives and monitoring on ROA (models 10, 14, and 18). Following this procedure, a one 
standard deviation increase in incentives would lead to a positive change in ROA of .31, .36, and 
.15 percentage points via the environmental variables VIOLATOR, REL_WASTE, and 
RECOVERY, respectively. For monitoring, the effects are a decrease in ROA of -.76 and -.22 
percentage points, via VIOLATOR and REL_WASTE, respectively. Given a mean of ROA of 
13.7%, these numbers are non-trivial. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Finally, looking at the impact of our two different proxies for incentive pay reveals some 
interesting additional insights. Models 19-20, 22-23, and 25-26 in Table 4 show that for all three 
environmental variables, the effect of equity and non-equity based incentives is the exact 
opposite. Thus, while equity-based incentives apparently lead managers to engage in more pro-
environmental strategies, incentives that are more short term in nature ￿ or do not relate 
managerial income directly to the stock performance of their firms ￿ seem to induce a negative 
stance towards environmental efforts. What causes these puzzling results? One explanation may 
be related to Campbell, Sefcik and Soderstrom￿s (2004) recent finding that non-equity incentives 
like bonuses and long term incentive plans are used by many firms to explicitly compensate 
managers for their additional risk exposure due to environmental issues. Having such 
compensation may tend to outweigh managers￿ concerns over the impact of external stakeholders 
on the firm or the managers themselves, and thus alleviate the incentive to engage in more 
environmental efforts. This appears to be in line, as well, with an interpretation that understands 
such additional elements of compensations as explicit incentives to adhere to shareholders￿ 
preferences of abstaining from environmental investments. 
Another possible explanation, which concurs with the spirit of our findings so far, is that 
managers do believe in a positive effect of environmental performance on financial performance, 
which should eventually find its way also into an enhanced stock performance. In this case, 
equity-based incentives should provide a relatively higher stimulus to undertake environmental 
efforts than non-equity based incentives. While this does not explain why the effect of non-equity IE Working Paper                                               DE8-114-I                              19 - 01 - 2005 
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based incentives appears to be negative, if we include both, equity and non-equity-based 
incentive variables in the same model (see models 21, 24, and 27) we find that the parameter 
estimates for non-equity incentives lose their significance, while the equity-based incentives 
continue to be significant and close to their original estimates. Thus, the primary effect appears to 
be the one emanating from equity-based incentives, which we discussed in length above. 
CONCLUSION 
We have started this paper with a discussion of the apparently changing relationships 
between firms and environmental issues. From a reactive, antagonistic stance towards 
environmental regulations, many firms have evolved to act in a pro-active fashion to integrate 
environmental issues into their core strategies. The driving force behind this development appears 
to be the growing insight that environmental efforts can potentially be a source of value for firms. 
Yet, shareholders do not seem to share these emergent views. In fact, they appear to be laggards 
with respect to recognizing the potential value of environmental strategies. Managers, on the 
other hand, are likely to have a more accurate and acute perception of these trends and 
possibilities. More accurate because of information asymmetries that afford them with a better 
perspective on the potential value creating properties of pro-active environmental activities; more 
acute because their role as the representatives of their firm exposes them to the growing demands 
of several stakeholder groups for a better environmental performance. Such demands can, indeed, 
become threats to managers￿ personal future by potentially tainting their reputation or leading to 
personal and even criminal liability in case of severe environmental underperformance. This two-
fold reason for managers to take environmental issues into account, however, also lead us to 
suspect that managers ￿ if they push for more environmental performance ￿ may either act very 
much in the interest of their shareholders, or follow private incentives in what, from the 
shareholders￿ perspective, would constitute a moral hazard situation. In this situation, a firm￿s 
corporate governance structure takes on a central role, as different solutions to the general 
governance problem create more or less ability for managers or shareholders to implement their 
preferences for or against higher environmental performance. 
Our empirical results deliver strong support for the view that shareholders are indeed 
￿laggards￿ in that they apparently act to hold back the environmental performance of firms ￿ 
while this very performance has apparently positive implications for firm financial performance. 
At the same time, we observe that managers, when having a relatively high level of strategic 
discretion as expressed in high equity-based incentive pay levels, push for a better environmental 
performance. While this seemingly violates the (empirically revealed) preferences of their 
shareholders, it does appear to be perfectly in line with investor￿s primary interest of value 
maximization. 
These findings add to the emerging literature on the value of environmental policies and 
particularly underscore the validity of Russo and Fouts￿ (1997) finding that environmental and 
financial performance are positively linked. As such, our results are clearly relevant for 
shareholders and other actors in financial markets ￿ going forward, the apparently antagonistic IE Working Paper                                           DE8-114-I                                   19 - 01 - 2005 
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relationship many equity-investors still display with respect to environmental issues should be 
challenged on the basis that shareholders may actually act against their own interest. Relatedly, 
our second main contribution, i.e. highlighting the differential role played by different 
governance mechanisms in promoting firm environmental performance, points to specific 
potential levers to influence firm environmental performance in the short term. Absent a change 
in investors￿ expressed preferences, increasing equity-based incentives could help a firm to utilize 
managers￿ apparently more accurate and acute understanding of environmental issues in order to 
improve environmental and subsequently firm performance. This constitutes a novel perspective 
in the current public discussion concerning the value and potential dangers of endowing 
executives with high levels of incentive pay following the significant corporate governance 
problems encountered in firms such as Enron over the last few years. In any case, these results 
add to the literature on corporate governance that attempts to identify the effects of certain 
structural elements of corporate governance on specific firm strategies and firm performance (e.g. 
Jenkins & Seiler, 1990; Sanders, 2001a, 2001b). 
Further, our results add to the ongoing debate on the value of environmental and social 
issue management and highlight the apparent fact that equity-investors are indeed still 
predisposed to an antagonistic view of environmental issues, while managers appear to be more 
pro-active. This paper makes a first step towards understanding the interactions between these 
pre-dispositions and the structural elements of a firm￿s corporate governance structure in 
affecting a critical social issue ￿ the environmental performance of firms. More research into 
these interactions is likely to yield a better comprehension of the firm internal drivers of 
environmental performance and the available levers for policy makers as well as for firm boards 
intent on enhancing a firms￿ social performance. 
Finally, two additional findings warrant further inquiry. First, the differential impact of 
equity vs. non equity-based incentives is still quite puzzling. We have offered two alternative 
explanations and believe further work is needed to explain this effect. Second, our regressions 
with firm financial performance as dependent variables show a negative effect of incentive pay 
on financial performance in our sample of several hundred U.S. firms over three years. While we 
do not have the space to explore these results in more depth, they add to a stream of not always 
consistent findings regarding the effect of incentives on performance (e.g., Sanders, 2001b; 
Akhigbe, Madura & Tucker, 1995; Mehran, 1995), and demonstrate the need for a better 
understanding of these relationships.  
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Table 1: Correlations 
^ <.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
   N  MEAN  STD. 
DEV.  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10  12  13 
1  GROWTH  1552  11.050  38.629                 
2  SIZE  1552  8.700  1.191  .03               
3  CAPITAL_INT  1552  2.402  3.191  .01  .01              
4 IND_CONC  1552  .209  .183  -.05* .13***  -.24***             
5 ROA  1741  .137  .101  .07** -.05*  -.43***  .15***            
6  REL_WASTE 783  3.201 2.750 -.03 -.31***  -.08*  <.01  .17***           
7 RECOVERY  785 .688  .333  -.09* .05  -.19***  .12**  .19***  .06^          
8 VIOLATOR  1552 .201  .401  .10*** .23***  -.09**  .03  -.03  -.22***  -.05        
9  EQUITY_INC  1552  .559  .282  .01  -.00  .02  -.07**  -.05^  .10*  .20*** -.09**       
10  NON_EQUITY_
INC  1552 .204  .179  .05*  .15*** .07*  .04  .09*** -.10*  -.11**  .09**  -.65***       
12 OUTSIDER  1552 .784  .114  -.05*  .19*** .08**  -.00  -.12***  -.11** -.01  .18*** -0.01  .07**     
13 DIRTY  1805 .279  .449  .05^  .12***  -.13*** -.07**  -0.00  .05  -.09*  .39***  -.08*** .07** .15***   
14 CLEAN  1805 .223  .417  -.06*  .09***  .40***  -.12*** -.11*** -.18*** -.05  -.22*** -.01  .02  -.11*** -.33***     Are Shareholders Environmental ￿Laggards￿?     
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Table 2: Impact of Governance Structure on Environmental Performance 
Standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-sided. All models are overall significant at the <.001 level. OLS for REL_WASTE and RECOVERY; Logistic regression for VIOLATOR estimates 
probability that firm did incur a fine. Thus, a negative parameter estimate indicates a better environmental performance.  
^ <.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001;
 
Dep. Variable:  REL_WASTE  RECOVERY    VIOLATOR 
Model: 1  2  3  4    5  6 
































































































              
EQUITY-INC   1.43*** 
(.42)    .23*** 
(.04) 
    -0.72* 
(.29)  
OUTSIDER   -2.12* 
(1.07)    .03 
(.13) 
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Table 3: Impact of Environmental Performance on ROA 
  ROA vs. REL_Waste  ROA vs. RECOVERY  ROA vs. VIOLATOR 

















































































































































































                        
Environmental 
Variable 
  .01*** 
(<.01)    .01*** 
(<.01)    .02^ 
.010    .02* 
(.01)    -.02* 
(.01)    -.02** 
(.01) 
EQUITY-INC     -.02 
(.02) 
-.03^ 
(.02)    -.02^ 
(.01) 
-.03* 




OUTSIDER     -.03 
(.04) 
-.01 
(.04)    -.04 
(.03) 
-.04 




N  472 472  472  472  662  662  662  662  1292  1292  1292  1292 
R
2  .173 .226  .176  .233  .129  .133  .134  .141  .164 .169  .170  .175 
∆R
2  - .053  .003  .060  -  .004  .005  .012  - .005  .006  .011 
F-Test for ∆R
2  - 37.70**  .84  12.02**  -  3.01^  1.88  3.03*  - 7.72**  4.63**  5.69** 
Standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-sided. F-tests for ∆R-square in each case relate to the basic model without environmental and governance variables. All models are overall significant at 
the <.001 level. In all regressions, ROA is the dependent variable, and all other variables are lagged 1 period vis-￿-vis ROA. For each model, the respective ￿environmental variable￿ is the variable 
named in the head of the column. Since VIOLATOR is a dummy that is 1 if firm incurred a fine, a negative estimate for this measure of ￿bad￿ environmental performance indicates a positive 
contribution to ROA. 
^ <.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001;
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Table 4: Effect of different Types of Incentives 
Standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-sided. All models are overall significant at the <.001 level. Models 19, 22, and 25, are identical to models 2, 4 , and 6, respectively, and reproduced here 
to facilitate comparisons. 
^ <.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001;
 
Dep. Variable:  REL_WASTE  RECOVERY  VIOLATOR 
Model: 19 20 21 22 23  24 25 26 27 
















































































































































            
EQUITY-INC  1.43*** 
(.42)    1.56* 
(.61) 
.23*** 
(.04)    .27*** 
(.06) 
-.72* 
(.29)      -.68^ 
(.38)  
NON_EQUITY-
INC    -1.43* 
(.65) 
.28 
(.93)    -.22** 
(.07) 
.08 
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